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Food insecurity and hunger continue to threaten the lives and livelihoods of millions of people. Many of 
today's food crises are linked to violent conflicts in various ways. The number of people affected by conflict-
driven food crises increased from 74 million in 2018 to more than 77 million one year later—particularly in 
north-eastern Nigeria, South Sudan, Afghanistan, Syria and Yemen. The achievement of food security 
ending hunger and malnutrition and enabling sustainable agriculture production as addressed by 
Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 2 'Zero Hunger' depends therefore largely on progress made on SDG 
16 in promoting peaceful and inclusive societies.  
However, the severe food crises in the past decade have demonstrated the weaknesses to govern 
food (in)security in conflict settings. While national governments or belligerents are often unable or 
unwilling to respond adequately to food crises, humanitarian relief operations face the challenges of 
reaching those people most in need of food supply and simultaneously avoiding exacerbating the 
conflict. This has left many of the affected communities having to find their own responses to food 
insecurity. If food crises are to be effectively addressed, research and policy actions need to tackle 
both food crises and violent conflict.  
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 Respect access to food as a human right: Any policy action needs to be based on the common 
understanding that access to food is a human right. Providing safe, continued and sufficient 
access to food is, foremost, the respective government's role. Every government should 
pursue preventive policies and take emergency measures to secure food equally for all parts 
of its population. If a government lacks the capacity to prevent or mitigate a food crisis, it 
should allow and facilitate relief operations as demanded by humanitarian law. Any 
government or warring faction that prohibits parts of the population from access to food 
needs to be sanctioned. 
 Build a bridge between humanitarian assistance, development and peacebuilding: Food 
assistance, if implemented well, plays a key role in mitigating the devastating effects of conflicts 
and in contributing to peace. While short-term assistance needs to be based on sound conflict 
analysis and a better understanding of the structural factors which determine vulnerabilities, long-
term food assistance should actively integrate peacebuilding approaches. In line with current 
debates of the humanitarian–development–peace (HDP) nexus, improving food security needs 
greater cooperation and coordination between actors in humanitarian assistance, development 
cooperation and peacebuilding. 
 Integrate local capacities: Conflict-affected populations adopt multiple strategies to secure food, 
and these depend on a multitude of factors such as the conflict context, intensity, and duration, 
an individual's situation, access to resources and support and governance. LocaI response 
mechanisms and capacities to food crises and conflict need to be better understood and best 
practices integrated into relief operations and national response strategies. 
 Improve the data situation and links to early action in conflict settings: While early warning 
systems for famine have advanced over the past decades, challenges remain in accessing data 
in conflict settings and linking them to early action. The development of an integrated 
platform combining early warning systems for famine and violent conflict could add important 
data and the missing link to assess famine, drought and conflict risk more comprehensively 
while advancing anticipatory humanitarian action in fragile and conflict-affected settings. 
 
1. Introduction 
Food insecurity remains one of the greatest global challenges. Since 2014, the number of people 
affected by hunger worldwide has been rising again: In 2019, almost 750 million people were exposed 
to extreme food insecurity (FAO et al., 2020), out of whom almost 135 million people in 55 countries 
or territories were classified to be in crisis conditions or worse (IPC/CH Phase 3 or above). Violent 
conflicts undoubtedly play a decisive role in current food crises. In 2019, more than 77 million people 
in 22 countries were affected by conflict-driven food crises (FSIN, 2020). In addition, it is worth to 
mention, that violent conflicts have severe short and long-term impacts on the nutrition status of 
children .1 
Food insecurity and violent conflicts are mostly found in regions with a high degree of fragility. Africa 
is still most affected by food crises: 54 per cent of the population globally facing food crises or worse 
                                                          
1 Studies in different contexts find evidence that conflict-affected children are shorter than children born in regions not 
affected by conflict. Moreover, negative effects on child weight at birth were observed if the mother was exposed to conflict 
during pregnancy. Physical and cognitive impacts have also been found in adults who were exposed to conflict in their early 
years (Brück et al., 2016). 
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(IPC/CH Phase 3 or higher2) are located in Africa (Fig.1). In East Africa, particularly in South Sudan, 
armed conflicts, violent extremism, inter-communal violence and other localised tensions mainly 
affect peace and security. Further conflict-driven food crises emerged in two other African regions: 
the Lake Chad Basin—comprising the borderlands of Cameroon, Chad, Niger and northern Nigeria—
and the Central Sahel, affecting Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger (FSIN, 2020). In both areas, insecurity 
and jihadist groups' expansionist aspirations have led to massive violent incidents and displacement 
of populations, destruction or closure of basic social services, disruption or permanent breakdown of 
productive activities, markets and trade flows. In Asia and the Middle East region, 40 million people 
are affected by conflict-driven food crises, especially Yemen, Afghanistan, and Syrian Arab Republic, 
where political, social and economic grievances or geopolitical tensions have sparked protracted 
violent and armed conflicts (FSIN, 2020). 
This briefing paper looks at the multiple dimensions between current food crises and violent conflicts 
and identifies four key areas for a comprehensive response that addresses food insecurity and violent 
conflict. 
  
                                                          
2 IPC/CH Phase: Integrated Phase Classification is a standardised classification system to describe the anticipated severity of 
food emergencies / food insecurity according to a five-phase scale: minimal, stressed, crisis, emergency, famine. 
(https://fews.net/IPC) 
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Figure 1: Food insecurity, violent conflicts and fragility in Africa 2015–2021.   
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2. Multiple dimensions of food crises and violent conflicts 
Over the past decade, a growing body of research has examined the mutual impact between violent 
conflicts and food insecurity (for an overview, see Brück et al., 2016; Martin-Shields & Stojetz, 2019) 
and indicated strong correlations on multiple layers. However, food insecurity, as well as violent 
conflicts, are characterised by a high degree of complexity and contextualisation. Thus, discussions 
about the state of food insecurity and the typology of violent conflicts tend to become objectives in 
themselves. Criteria for determining the state of food insecurity are usually based on the four 
dimensions of availability, access, stability and utilisation and encompass a range of variables covering 
different sectors such as health, food prices and agricultural production. Analyses of food security 
range from the individual to the global level, and are classified by severity (FSIN, 2020).  
Typologies of violent conflict differentiate between the duration and intensity of violent conflicts, 
between root causes, key drivers, or ways of mobilisation as well as between domestic, regional and 
inter-state constellations (for an overview, see Demmers, 2016).3 Each of these typologies entails a 
certain interpretation of violent conflicts. However, a categorisation of violent conflicts which centres 
on food (in)security is missing so far. To narrow this gap, we will link the logics of war to food 
(in)security. We will identify three dimensions of how violent conflicts have an impact on food 
(in)security.  
 
2.1 Destruction and food insecurity 
The general principle of violent conflicts is that belligerent parties aim to harm, defeat or even 
eliminate their 'enemy'. Consequently, the emergence of frontlines, battlefields and war zones is an 
inevitable effect of violent conflicts, even if the current technological upgrading of modern armies and 
warfare (e.g. drones) aims to increase the accuracy of military attacks (Prinz & Schetter, 2017). This is 
why by and large, violent interactions go hand in hand with physical destruction, affecting people's 
vulnerabilities in various ways.  
In general, Collier (1999) finds that the gross domestic product (GDP) per capita declines at an annual 
rate of 2.2 per cent during civil wars.  
Since in many of today's conflict-affected countries, the majority of people depend on small-scale 
farming to provide food and income for their households, small-scale agriculture is particularly 
affected: The destruction (e.g. bombing) or contamination (e.g. land mines, chemical weapons) of 
agricultural areas, as well as infrastructure (irrigation networks, roads, bridges, buildings, etc.), might 
force farmers to abandon agriculture altogether. Farmers may also no longer be able to cultivate their 
fields for lack of access to seeds and fertiliser, credits and capital, due to the uncertainty of access to 
buyers and markets and the displacement or killing of people (Baumann & Kuemmerle, 2016).  
Especially when the expansion of war zones provokes forced migration on a large scale, the impacts 
on food security are direct and severe—not only in the short term but often also in the long term. 
Forced migration not only leads to the collapse of agricultural production and infrastructure but also 
disrupts or interrupts local and regional supply chains and increases food prices on local markets. At 
the same time, displaced people have to give up their livelihoods as producers of food (farmers, 
pastoralists etc.) and are thus exposed to food insecurity themselves (Brück et al., 2016), especially if 
they become dependent on food aid from humanitarian organisations and cannot restart agricultural 
activities.  
The rehabilitation of war zones for food production and food supply takes decades. Clearing 
battlefields (de-mining), re-building physical infrastructure and establishing operational governance 
                                                          
3 The question of when a violent conflict can be labelled as 'war' is still ongoing. Its definition in International Law 
(declaration of war) diverges from the one in Peace and Conflict Studies (e.g. number of causalities). 
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structures is costly and takes time. Moreover, such phases of post-war reconstruction are 
overshadowed by fierce disputes over access to and ownership of land and water, as property rights 
often change hands in times of war (Van Leeuwen & Van Der Haar, 2016). Thus, food insecurity, for 
poor populations in particular, often persist beyond the end of a violent conflict.  
 
2.2 Food (in)security and warring factions  
Food supply is of strategic importance to any armed group—from large-scale armies to vigilant gangs 
(Justino & Stojetz, 2016). This is why armed groups' presence and rule directly impact local food 
security and the control of production areas. Historically, the supply of large armies with food went 
hand in hand with the plundering of food storages and the looting of civilian households and markets. 
Although looting is still a common strategy, the links between armed groups' presence and food 
security are more complex: Armed groups might show a strong interest in local food production and 
other goods. Combatants can take direct control over agricultural resources and livestock for 
sustenance or levy taxes on these products. For example, in Syria and Iraq, the agrarian zones seized 
by Islamic State were maintained to a large extend, despite massive forced displacement (Eklund et 
al., 2017). 
People in conflict-affected contexts also adjust their practices to changing politics and (local) political 
actors. To protect their livelihoods and food security, people might (voluntarily or coerced) cooperate 
with armed groups (Martin-Shields & Stojetz, 2019). On the one hand, individuals participate in and 
support armed groups because they may benefit from the conflict through improved economic 
opportunities, such as access to food, looting and appropriation of agricultural land or livestock (Keen, 
1998). On the other, people, such as farmers in agricultural off-seasons, might be recruited as part-
time fighters.  
 
2.3 Hunger as a weapon  
When violent conflicts are directed against certain social segments, food insecurity can become "a 
weapon of war" (Messer & Cohen, 2015)—either as a direct strategy or as a by-product. The goal is 
either to deprive a particular warring party of the population's support or to eliminate entire 
population groups (ethnic cleansing, genocide). Direct strategies include cutting off food supplies to 
harm hostile armies and the population supporting them (De Waal, 2018). Similarly, blocking food 
access and destroying food infrastructure ("scorched earth") are calculated military techniques not 
only to ignite mass starvation, malnutrition and hunger among the population but also to foster forced 
migration. Although the number of victims of mass starvation has declined in the past decades, it is 
still a widely-used military strategy in ongoing conflict zones such as Yemen, Syria, South Sudan or the 
Central African Republic. 
Strategies may also include preventing humanitarian access. In recent food crises, Al-Shabaab in 
Somalia, Islamic State in Syria or commanders in South Sudan refused aid from humanitarian agencies. 
Governments themselves often violate the humanitarian principle and reject international relief 
operations, especially if they form part of the conflict, as could be witnessed in Syria and Yemen. The 
bypassing of humanitarian principle can also extend to donor governments; one reason for the 
delayed response to the food crisis in Somalia in 2011 was the US anti-terrorist legislation, which made 
it difficult for humanitarian organisations to provide assistance to areas controlled by Al-Shabaab (De 
Waal, 2018). 
We have shown how the three interrelated dimensions of war logics—destruction, rule of armed 
groups and hunger as a weapon—have multiple effects on people's food insecurity. However, other 
factors, such as (conflict-related) increases in food and seed prices as well as (changing) climatic 
conditions, often amplify the exposure to conflict and food insecurity (Martin-Shields & Stojetz, 2019). 
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In many of today's conflict-affected countries, smallholder farmers, who are already vulnerable in the 
absence of conflicts (natural hazards) present a large part of the population. Conflict is an additional 
'shock' that affects these populations' livelihoods and well-being (Brück et al, 2016). In times of war, 
natural hazards affect the population much harder and increase the difficulty of access to food 
dramatically. As the most severe natural hazards, droughts exacerbate the effect of food (in)security. 
Droughts as 'creeping' or slow-onset disasters usually affect larger land areas than other types of 
disasters and make mitigation and adaptation strategies difficult to implement. Many of the adverse 
effects of drought often accumulate slowly and may persist for years after the event has ended 
(Wirkus & Piereder, 2019). 
What is less clear is whether food insecurity in turn sparks, intensifies or perpetuates conflict. While 
food insecurity alone is not likely to cause violent conflicts, it can increase social grievances in 
combination with socio-economic and political inequalities. These exclude parts of the population 
(particularly youth) from economic activities and participation in political decision-making processes, 
which ultimately can fuel civil unrest or conflicts (Brinkman & Hendrix, 2011; Vestby et al., 2018). 
Besides structural conditions, rising food prices have been found to exacerbate the risk of political 
unrest and conflicts, particularly in urban settings. The dominant explanation for the vicious circle of 
price and violent conflict are consumer grievances: Higher prices create or increase economic 
constraints and/or sentiments of (perceived) relative deprivation, which activate grievances that, in 
turn, can lead to conflict (whereas conflict is likely to increase food prices again) (Raleigh et al., 2015). 
These grievances can be directed against the state if it fails to secure food for the population in the 
face of rising global food prices. In Africa, rising food prices and unrest were associated with more 
political repression (Berazneva & Lee, 2013). 
 
3. Addressing food crises and violent conflict 
The complex relationships between food crises and violent conflicts require comprehensive and 
adapted policy actions. These actions must refer to the reduction of food insecurity as an effect of 
violent conflict and consider the reduction of violent conflict or conflict risks itself. We thus suggest 
four key areas for a multi-faceted response that addresses food insecurity and violent conflict. 
 
3.1 Respect access to food as a human right during violent conflict 
Access to food is a human right. Any government should pursue preventive policies and take 
emergency measures to secure food equally for all parts of its population. If a government lacks the 
capacity to prevent or mitigate a food crisis, it should allow and facilitate relief operations as 
demanded by humanitarian law (Akande & Gillard, 2019). However, national governments or 
belligerents are often unable or unwilling to respond adequately to food crises. At the same time, 
international relief operations face the challenges of reaching the people most in need and of avoiding 
exacerbating the conflict.  
Therefore, all actors must comply with the provisions to protect the population from intended 
starvation and with humanitarian principles to guarantee humanitarian access. Any government or 
warring faction that prohibits parts of the population from access to food needs to be sanctioned. UN 
Security Council Resolution 2417 is a major step in this direction. The Resolution stresses the 
importance of compliance by belligerents with international humanitarian law and condemns the 
denial of humanitarian access to affected civilians (UNSC, 2018). Most importantly, the Resolution 
stipulates that the obstruction of humanitarian access in conflict settings can result in targeted 
sanctions, as already used, for example, for Al-Shabaab in Somalia (Akande & Gillard, 2019). Thus, the 
resolution has the potential to be used by UN agencies to monitor and report robustly on human-
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induced food crises in conflicts and to call on the Security Council and the international community to 
act (Zappalà, 2019). 
 
3.2 Build bridges between humanitarian action, development and peacebuilding 
The genuine role of international relief operations in food crises is to prevent or alleviate human 
suffering induced by disasters and conflicts. Short-term food assistance during violent conflicts usually 
focuses on improving food consumption of conflict-affected people and communities. It also aims to 
support the most vulnerable, such as displaced persons, children, pregnant and nursing women. 
However, relief operations in conflict settings often face challenges in guaranteeing aid workers' 
safety and security, gaining necessary data of affected populations and reaching those people most in 
need in a timely and appropriate manner (see, for example, Tranchant et al., 2019). At the same time, 
food interventions risk becoming a source of conflict themselves, primarily because of an inadequate 
understanding of the conflict setting (Devereux, 2000). The misappropriation of food aid in particular, 
such as the usurpation of food by violent actors, can fuel political grievances and perpetuate conflict. 
Moreover, food aid can undermine local food production and markets and affect the development of 
local capacity (Hendrix & Brinkman, 2013). A clear and locally informed analysis of the conflict and its 
context as well as increased equity and accountability is needed to prevent negative impacts of food 
aid in conflict environments.  
While short-term food aid focuses primarily on alleviating human suffering rather than resolving 
violent conflict, long-term humanitarian assistance, as provided particularly in protracted crises or 
post-conflict situations, can identify potential conflicts and address them, reducing the risk of conflict 
flare-ups. Usually, these interventions have a stronger impact than the immediate supply of food (or 
cash/vouchers) and already include development assistance measures. Long-term food assistance 
can, therefore, play a crucial role in building local capacity, restoring agricultural production and, 
ultimately, consolidating peace. However, it is crucial to initiate its provision early enough and to 
consider the amounts needed. It is also vital that it reaches the people who need it most, such as IDPs, 
host communities and returnees (Hendrix & Brinkman, 2013; Lander & Richards, 2019). Nevertheless, 
aid agencies need to be aware that the longer food aid is provided, the more it has a direct impact on 
the local food market and price trends. Therefore, nuanced planning and management are required 
to avoid affecting smallholders' livelihoods by flooding them with aid. 
To effectively address these challenges, long-term food assistance needs to bridge humanitarian 
action, development intervention and peacebuilding. Thus, food assistance is a key instrument 
addressed in current debates of the humanitarian–development–peace (HDP) nexus, which calls for 
greater cooperation and coordination among actors in humanitarian aid, development cooperation 
and peacebuilding. 
 
3.3 Integrate local capacities 
Conflict-affected populations adopt very different strategies to secure food. These strategies depend 
on multiple factors such as the conflict context, intensity and duration, the individual situation, access 
to resources and support, and governance. For example, rather than aiming to maximise agricultural 
profits, farmers may change their crop production to a low-risk, low-return strategy by switching their 
production from cash crops to less profitable crops as these crops provide food for subsistence or can 
be easily transferred in case of displacement. However, maintaining these low-risk-low-return 
strategies after conflicts end affects their recovery and can further affect their livelihood in the long 
run (Arias et al., 2017). 
Similarly, pastoralists may adapt livestock production to the conflict, e.g. by selling livestock to have 
sufficient cash or hiding livestock from armed groups or local ruling groups (Brück et al, 2016). Also, 
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studies have shown that households increase their use of safety nets to minimise uncertainty. Support 
ranges from cash transfers to in-kind assistance received by the household (Brück & d’Errico, 2019). 
Remittances are also an important safety net in responding to food crises and conflict but still much 
needs to be learned about its role for affected people (Haan et al., 2012). Therefore, local response 
mechanisms to food crises and conflicts need to be better understood and successfull practices 
incorporated into relief efforts and national response strategies while, at the same time, striving to 
avoid potential harm.   
 
3.4 Improve the data situation and better link different data sets with early action 
Early warning mechanisms for famine such as FEWS NET have advanced over the last 35 years towards 
better predicting and managing food crises. They provide decision-makers and relief organisations 
with a rigorous, evidence- and consensus-based analysis of food insecurity and acute malnutrition 
situations. However, several challenges remain: First, in violent conflicts, access to data needed for 
comprehensive analysis and timely warning is often restricted. Second, the announcement of a food 
emergency is highly political and often challenged by claims of sovereignty (Lander & Richards, 2019). 
Third, even if warnings are timely and allow careful planning, adequate finance mechanisms are often 
not in place. Recent developments in anticipatory action, such as FAO's Early Warning Early Action or 
ICRC's forecast-based financing approach, aim to close the gap between forecasting tools and delayed 
response but still face multiple challenges in adjusting these to food crises and conflict (Wagner & 
Jaime, 2020). Forth, a knowledge gap still exists between data that is available to assess the food 
security situation and data on conflict early warning. Conflict early warning and forecasting systems 
such as UCDP ViEWS, ACLED Pulse) address this knowledge dilemma. They have the potential to close 
the "conflict assessment gap" of current food crisis warning systems (Wirkus & Piereder, 2019).  
An integrated platform developed to combine early warning data sets for famines and violent conflicts 
could provide a better basis for a more comprehensive assessment of famine, drought and conflict 
risk and advance anticipatory humanitarian action in fragile and conflict-affected settings. 
Taking into account these four key areas could help national governments and international 
humanitarian and development organisations to take effective preventive, anticipatory and 
emergency action against food crises during violent conflict, while at the same time integrating 
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